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Abstract
The German health care reform of 1997 provides a natural experiment for evaluating the price
sensitivity of demand for physicians' services. As a part of the reform, co-payments for prescription
drugs were increased step up to 200%. However, certain groups of people were exempted from the
increase, providing a natural control group against which the changed demand for physicians' services of
the treated, those subject to increased co-payments, can be assessed. The differences-in-differences
estimates indicate that increased co-payments reduced the number of doctor visits by about 10% on an
average.
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1 Introduction
Expenditures for health services make up a substantial part of total GDP in all OECD
countries. For most countries, health expenditures as a share of total GDP have trended
upward over the last years and decades. In Germany, for example, the share increased from
8.4 percent in 1980 to 10.5 percent in 1996 [1]. The most commonly cited reasons for this
increase are expanding technological possibilities in the health service sector as well as the
ageing of the population, coupled in many countries with a large public health service where
the incentive structure does not promote an efficient resource allocation.
One such country with a large publicly funded health sector is Germany. There have
been regular attempts to reform the health care system in order to reduce cost (or limit its
growth). The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of such a major reform that
took place in Germany in 1997. In that reform, co-payments for prescription drugs were
raised by up to 200 percent.
Among the professed goals of the reform was to mitigate the moral hazard problem inher-
ent in providing free or low-cost insurance. A number of indicators collected and published
by insurance companies suggest that the problem of excessive use of prescription drugs was
real and substantial [2]. According to this source, an estimated quarter of all prescriptions
has no confirmed therapeutic benefit. Drugs worth 4 billion DM are disposed of each year
as waste, a fifth of these in packages that were never opened.
In this paper, I will evaluate whether the reform was a success, judged by its own objec-
tives. Thus, I will study whether the reform lowered the demand for health services using
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the framework of a natural experiment, i.e., comparing outcomes for a treatment group
with outcomes for a control group. This is possible, since certain groups of the population
were exempt from the increase. These people provide a natural control group against which
the changed demand for physicians’ services of the treated, those subject to increased co-
payments, can be assessed. The preferred differences-in-differences estimator indicates that
increased co-payments reduced the number of doctor visits by 15 percent on average.
2 The German Health Care System and the Reform of
1997
More than 90 percent of the German population is covered by statutory health insurance,
which always includes coverage for prescription pharmaceuticals. The insurance system is
mostly financed by mandatory payroll deductions. For employees, the premium is propor-
tional to earnings (up to a contribution ceiling), and coverage automatically extends to
non-working spouses and dependent children. Employees with earnings above the contribu-
tion ceiling have the option to remain insured, buy private insurance, or have no insurance
at all. Special provisions exist for other groups, such as the unemployed or students. All in
all, the system mixes insurance aspects with strong redistributive elements.
Once a person is part of the system, the insurance reimburses the cost of doctor vis-
its (including visits to general practitioners, specialists, and dentists), hospital stays, and
qualifying pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceuticals are either sold over the counter, or they are
available against a prescription. Only physicians can issue such a prescription, so that a
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doctor consultation must in general precede the purchase of the drug. All outpatient care
prescription drugs are dispensed by retail pharmacies who charge uniform prices all over
Germany.
Over the counter drugs are paid for directly by the patient, without any involvement of
the insurer. In the case of prescription drugs, retail pharmacies directly charge the insurance
companies for the price of the prescription, minus any out-of-pocket contribution that may
be required of the patient. One consequence of this reimbursement system is that the patient
in most cases is unaware of the full cost of the medicine. There are two potential types of
out-of-pocket expenses. The most important one is the prescription fee – referred to as
co-payment in this paper – that must be made for all prescriptions. The amount varies by
package size. Such co-payments were increased substantially on July 1, 1997, by a fixed
amount of DM 6 relative to a year earlier. Since the absolute amount of the co-payment is
a function of the package size, after the reform DM 9 for small, DM 11 for medium and DM
13 for large sizes, the relative effect of the 1997 reform was largest for small sizes, where it
amounted to a 200 percent increase.
An additional, second type of out-of-pocket expense refers to a maximum reimbursement
for certain classes of pharmaceuticals where both brand products and generics are sold in the
market. In such cases, a regulatory board can set reference prices, usually above the price of
the generic and below the price of the brand. In this case, the reference price constitutes the
maximum contribution covered by the insurer, and a patient buying the brand would need
to pay the extra amount herself. This system has some noticable effects on producer prices,
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as shown in [3]. In particular, producer prices for brand pharmaceuticals fell substantially
following the introduction of reference pricing in 1989. However, this aspect is not central
to the present analysis, as it likely affects only the relative demand for brands and generics,
rather than the overall demand for prescription drugs.
3 Potential Consequences of the Reform
How large was the effect of the reform on the demand for prescription drugs and other aspects
of health care utilization, and how successful was the reform in reducing perceived excess
demand for health services? In assessing the effects of the reform on the demand for health
services, one can usefully distinguish between a direct and an indirect effect. The direct
effect is a movement up the demand curve for prescription drugs, i.e., a reduced number of
drug purchases after the reform, as the increased co-payment directly increased the patient’s
out-of-pocket expenses for drug purchases. The indirect effect is a potential inward shift of
the demand curve for doctor visits, to be explained below.
According to [4], the number of prescriptions payed for by the social health insurance
fell by 11% between 1996 and 1997. However, one has to be cautious when interpreting this
number. First, the number of reimbursed prescriptions falls automatically, since prescription
drugs priced below the level of the co-payment no longer require a payment by the insurer,
and therefore are not counted in the statistics. Thus, even if demand is completely inelastic,
the instances of drug reimbursements will decline following an increase in the co-payment.
Moreover, the reform changed the relative prices of the various package sizes. In particular,
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larger packages became less expensive relative to smaller packages, and one would expect to
find a shift in demand towards these larger packages. Hence, a mere drop in the number of
prescriptions does not necessarily indicate a decline in the total quantity of drugs demanded.
The indirect effect is related to the impact a price change for prescription drugs may
have on the demand for doctor visits. There are good reasons to think that the indirect
effect may be quantitatively as important as the direct one. Since all prescriptions are
issued by physicians, the demand for doctor visits and the demand for prescription drugs
are intrinsically linked. The two are close complements, and one would expect to observe a
negative cross-price elasticity.
From the insurance point of view, therefore, increased co-payments can lower overall ex-
penditures through two related channels, and any evaluation of the reform should reasonably
take both into account. This is even more so since, as remarked before, people may have
switched to larger package sizes. In this case it is possible, for instance, that the total amount
of drugs demanded remained unchanged while the number of doctor visits went down (since
fewer prescriptions needed to be issued). Of course, the link between doctor visits and the
patient price for prescription drugs is more complicated than this simple example suggests.
While all prescriptions require a doctor visit, only a fraction of all visits is undertaken in
order to obtain a prescription. For example, one might see a doctor in order to seek advice
on non-prescription or self-treatment, and one might not comply with the prescription and
just not buy the drug. In either case, the number of visits would tend to be unaffected by
the increased co-payment. If there is a combination of the two effects, the number of visits
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will go down, and it is an empirical question to quantify the size of the overall effect.
********************
Figure 1 about here
********************
For all these reasons, it can be argued, that evaluating the effect of the 1997 reform
on the number of doctor visits is an important part of any overall evaluation. Mainly
due to data considerations, the present paper will deal with this single aspect, although a
future evaluation that includes direct evidence on the demand for pharmaceuticals is clearly
desirable. The goal is then to provide estimates of the extent to which individual demand
for doctor visits changed due to the reform.
Two prior studies in this area are [4] and [5]. The forme study uses evidence from a
survey of 695 visitors to pharmacies in Cologne in 1998. The limitations of this approach
were pointed out in the latter study, where an alternative evaluation based on simple pre-
post-reform comparisons using data from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) was
performed. The present paper improves on this previous research by exploiting an important
aspect of the reform, namely that it did leave some people unaffected, in order to perform
differences-in-differences estimation.
First, there is the group of people with private insurance. The content of private insurance
contracts is quite diverse, and some of the contracts are designed to provide coverage similar
to the social insurance, albeit at lower cost. These contracts usually have a number of
safeguards against moral hazard in place, such as a substantial annual deductible and a
7
premium payback for non-users. Thus, it is unlikely that prescription drug co-payments,
even if their level would have been synchronized with the reform (which again was not the
case in most contracts), play a significant role for this group of people.
A second group explicitly exempted from the increased co-payments are co-insured chil-
dren under the age of 18. A third type of exemption status has been defined by the law
through a combination of income and exposure, in an attempt to limit the financial burden
related to the provision of health services for low-income families. In particular, low-income
households with family gross income under DM 1700 (for singles) or DM 2350 (for couples)
were exempt, as were all amounts beyond a cumulative annual co-payments of 2 percent of
annual gross income. Since I cannot measure exposure directly, I will proxy the group of
people qualifying for this exemption status by defining a group of “poor” persons as those
whose income is in the first decile of the income distribution and who receive social as-
sistance. Thus, there are three exempt populations, people with private insurance, young
individuals, and the poor. All three groups will serve as “controls” in the following analysis,
taking the perspective of a “natural experiment”.
4 Data and Methods
The GSOEP was initiated in 1984 [6]. It is an annual survey that is ongoing. For the purpose
of this study, I selected a period of five years centered around the year of the reform, i.e.,
1995 - 1999. The GSOEP has a handful of variables relating to the usage of health service.
One of them is the number of visits to a doctor during the previous 3 months. In some
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earlier years, this question was asked separately for visits to a general practitioner visits to
a specialist, separately by field, and visits to a dentist. However, only the aggregate count
is available in the 1995-1999 waves. I use observations on men and women from Sample
A, i.e., persons associated with non-guestworker-households in the original sample for West
Germany. Privately insured individuals (about 5 percent of the sample) are included.
The basic empirical strategy is to pool the data over the five years and estimate the
effects of the reform by comparing the expected number of visits before and after the reform
ceteris paribus, i.e., for an individual with constant characteristics. Let the model be
yit = exp(β0 + β1 treati + β2 postt + β3 treati × postt + z′itγ) + uit (1)
where yit is the number of doctor visits of person i at time t, postt is an indicator whether
the increased co-payment is applicable in period t, treati is an indicator whether person i is
subject to the increased co-payment, and the interaction between treati and postt denotes
an observation of a treated person after the reform. The vector zit stands for all other
socio-economic characteristics controlled for in the regression. These include a second order
polynomial in age, three indicators for the quarter of the interview, four indicators for em-
ployment status plus the variables years of education, married, household size, active sport,
good health, bad health, private insurance, welfare recipient (the coding of these variable is
explained in an appendix).
In equation (1), β3 measures the reform effect. If it is negative, the demand for doctor
visits in the treatment group fell relative to the demand in the control group after the impo-
sition of the increased co-payments. Since the conditional expectation function is log-linear,
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the coefficient identifies the relative change in expected demand. The dependent variable
being a count (the number of doctor visits in the previous quarter), efficient estimation re-
quires that the conditional expectation function implied by (1) is embedded into a count
data model.
I will employ in the following analysis two different samples and two different econometric
models. Remember that the reform took place in mid-1997. Thus, depending on the month
of the interview, 1997 observations relate either to the pre-reform or to the post-reform
period. For this reason, and in order to avoid transition affects, it seems prudent to drop
1997 observations from the sample. In a first set of estimations, then, four years of data
are used, with 1995 and 1996 being pre-reform years, and 1998 and 1999 being post-reform
years. Deleting observations with missing values on any of the dependent or independent
variables, this sample comprises 37319 observations. I will refer to it as Sample A. To check
the robustness of the results, I also use an alternative sample where only two years of data
are kept, namely 1996 and 1998. The sample size then drops to 18683 observations. This is
my Sample B. Note that in either case, the critique by [7] that tests based on conventional
differences in differences estimators overstate the significance level does not apply, since the
panel is short.
The second issue is how to account for the panel structure of the data. Clearly, repeated
person specific observations cannot be independent in the strict sense, since individual effects
are likely present. I account for correlated observations in either one of two possible ways.
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First, I use a Poisson probability function
f(yit|λit) = exp(−λit)λ
yit
it
yit!
(2)
where
λit = E(yit|λit) = exp(β0 + β1 treati + β2 postt + β3 treati × postt + z′itγ) (3)
The model parameters are estimated by pseudo maximum likelihood, using the random
sampling likelihood function
L = exp
− N∑
i=1
Ti∑
t=1
λit
 N∏
i=1
Ti∏
t=1
λyitit
yit!
(4)
and a covariance matrix estimator that accounts for heteroscedasticity of unknown form and
correlation between observations for the same person. As long as the conditional expectation
function is correctly specified this approach leads to consistent parameter estimates and valid
inference although it is inefficient [8].
The alternative is to use a count data model with random effects. Let
E(yit|λit, αi) = λit exp(αi) (5)
where the conditional distribution of yit given λit and αi is a Poisson distribution, λit is
defined as in (3), and αi is independently gamma distributed. The resulting marginal model
is a panel Poisson model of a negative binomial variety, with joint probability function for
individual i
f(yi1, . . . , yiT ) =
Γ(
∑
t yit + γ)
Γ(γ)
(
γ
γ +
∑
t λit
)γ
1
(γ +
∑
t λit)
∑
t
yit
T∏
t=1
(
λyitit
yit!
)
(6)
where γ is an additional parameter. This model provides potentially more efficient parameter
estimates than the Poisson model [9].
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5 Results
Sample means and definitions of the variables involved in the analysis are given in the
appendix. For example, the average number of doctor visits per quarter is 2.8. 53 percent
of the person-year observations are associated with “good” health, based on a subjective
self-evaluation, and 17 percent are associated with bad health.
Two sets of full regression results, one for the Poisson model and one for the panel Poisson
model with gamma heterogeneity, denoted here as a “panel negbin” model, are displayed in
Table 1. The estimates are based on Sample A, i.e., they include observations for the years
1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999. No differences in differences are used here, but rather a simple
pre-post reform comparison, which makes these results directly comparable to those in [5].
In the Poisson model the standard errors are adjusted to account for heteroscedasticity of
unknown form and correlation between observations for the same person. A formal likelihood
ratio test clearly rejects the Poisson model against the panel negbin model. A comparison of
the estimated standard errors suggests that some efficiency is gained indeed by estimating
the panel model.
The estimated parameters differ somewhat between the two specifications, although they
tend to give the same qualitative results. In particular both models estimate a drop in
the expected number of doctor visits in the post-reform period of 9-10 percent. Many of
the other results are common in the literature: men have fewer doctor visits than women.
The health indicators have the largest effect among all variables. A person in bad health is
estimated to have four times as many doctor visits as a person in good health. Interestingly,
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engaging actively in sports increases the number of visits once we control for general health.
The full differences-in-differences estimates based on Sample A are shown in Table 2. The
purpose of these comparisons is to see whether the reform effect can be causally attributed
to the increased co-payments (rather than other aspects of the reforms, or third aggregate
influences unrelated to the 1997 reform). The strategy is to compute the change in expected
visits before and after the reform separately for a treatment group and a control group.
Since the data are not from a real experiment, the assignment to treatment and control has
to be based on evidence available in the survey. Three comparisons are considered. All of
them are based on count data regressions with the full set of other control variables included.
Specifically, I compare
• the pre-post change for privately insured persons (control) versus non-exempt statutory
insured (treatment)
• the pre-post change for youth aged 16-18 (control, since exempted from co-payment)
versus those aged 19 and above who are not otherwise exempt.
• the pre-post change for poor individuals (control, since presumably exempted from
co-payment) versus others (excluding the privately insured and the youth).
The division into treatment and control is admittedly imperfect. Most problematic is the
grouping based on welfare and low income status. For example, income is likely subject to
considerable reporting error. Moreover, a fraction of all persons identified as belonging to
the treatment may be exempt as well, because they have reached their maximum cumulative
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contribution by past co-payments during the year. Arguably, the first two comparisons are
less error prone. In addition, Table 2 also shows estimates from an additional model, where
all three exempt groups are combined into a single control group. In this last comparison, I
have 3547 observations as controls and 33772 observations for the treatment.
The reform effect is labeled here “differences in differences”. It is negative in all cases, and
also statistically significant except in the panel negbin estimates with poor persons as control
group. The combined effect, based on the panel negbin model, is a 13 percent reduction in
the expected number of visits of the treatment group relative to the control group. I also
show in the table the two components of the differences-in-differences estimates, namely the
pre-post change for the control group and the pre-post change of the treatment group. In
the combined sample, and again based on the panel negbin model, the expected number
of visits for the control group increased by 3 percent, although this change is insignificant.
The expected number of visits of the treatment group decreased by 10 percent, so that the
overall reform effect is the aforementioned reduction by 13 percent. This reasoning assumes
that in the absence of the reform, the change in the treatment group would have been equal
to the observed change for the control group.
In Table 3, I check how robust these results are with respect to the definition of the
sample. Sample B uses only one year of data before and after the reform each, 1996 and
1998. Clearly, this leads to a reduced precision of the parameter estimates, and a number of
effects that were significant in Sample A are now no longer statistically significant. However,
based on either the youth comparison or the combined effect, and considering the preferred
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panel negbin estimates, the main result stays the same, namely that the expected number
doctor visits dropped between 1996 and 1998 for the treatment group relative to the control
group, and that this effect is statistically significant. The point estimate is slightly smaller
in this case, yielding a 7 percent reduction in the expected number of visits that can be
causally linked to the reform.
6 Discussion
To summarize, the evidence strongly suggest a causal effect of the reform, in the sense
that the control group displayed no reduction or even an increase in the demand for doctor
visits between the pre- and post reform periods, whereas the treatment group did reduce its
demand by large amounts. The point estimates depend somewhat on the sample definition,
ranging from 7 to 13 percent in the negbin models with combined control groups. The results
therefore confirm previous findings based on simple differences, where a reform effect of 9-10
percent was found - about the average between the overall effects in Samples A and B.
Is the effect uncovered by this analysis really causal? Identification is through differences
in variation over time between affected and non-affected persons. By comparing treatment
and control, we allow for an unspecified time trend, beyond the individual socio-economic
characteristics controlled for in the regression. We require, however, that this unspecified
time trend is the same for the two groups. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, as it is
hard to imagine any other systematic factors responsible for changes in the relative demand
for doctor visits between 1996 and 1998.
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In particular, the differences-in-differences set-up also addresses another concern, namely
that even if the health care reform of 1997 was instrumental for reducing the subsequent
number of visits, it is still an additional step to attribute this effect to the increased co-
payments. The reforms consisted of a bundle of measures, the demand side policy of increased
co-payments being one of them. It was already argued elsewhere that these other measures
were unlikely to have produced the patterns found in the data [5]. The results presented here
provide additional support for this view. Since these additional changes (such as changed
budgeting procedures for doctor’s offices) affected treatment and control equally, their effect,
if any, should have cancelled out and left the overall results unaffected.
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Table 1. Maximum likelihood results.
Dependent variable: Number of doctor visits during the previous quarter.
Poisson Panel Negbin
Age/10 0.082** 0.066**
(0.033) (0.027)
Age squared/1000 -0.069** -0.011
(0.033) (0.028)
Male -0.160** -0.250**
(0.021) (0.017)
Years of schooling/10 -0.000 -0.027
(0.040) (0.035)
Married 0.078** 0.060**
(0.024) (0.016)
Active sport 0.060** 0.040**
(0.020) (0.011)
Good health -0.602** -0.479**
(0.019) (0.011)
Bad health 0.809** 0.648**
(0.021) (0.010)
Welfare recipient 0.054 0.027
(0.047) (0.025)
Logarithmic income 0.051** -0.018
(0.023) (0.013)
Private health insurance 0.059 0.028
(0.043) (0.022)
Post reform -0.097** -0.091**
(0.014) (0.006)
log-likelihood -101630 -81770
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, years 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999. Model includes furthermore
a constant, three indicator variable for the quarter of the interview (winter, spring, fall), four indicators of
employment status (full-time, part-time, self-employed, unemployed) and household size. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Coefficients with ** are significant at the 5% level. Coefficients with * are significant
at the 10% level. N=37319.
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Table 2. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for the Reform Effect, Sample A
Change pre-post Poisson model Panel Negbin
effect standard effect standard
error error
Private insurance
Control group (yes) 0.031 (0.065) 0.044 (0.029)
Treatment group (no) -0.098** (0.013) -0.090** (0.006)
Difference in Difference -0.130* (0.067) -0.134** (0.030)
Youth
Control group (age 16-18) 0.117 (0.102) 0.118 (0.073)
Treatment group (age 19-) -0.099** (0.013) -0.088** (0.006)
Difference in Difference -0.216** (0.103) -0.207** (0.074)
Poor
Control group (yes) 0.125 (0.114) -0.019 (0.053)
Treatment group (no) -0.112** (0.014) -0.102** (0.007)
Difference in Difference -0.238** (0.115) -0.082 (0.053)
Combined†
Control group (yes) 0.056 (0.052) 0.027 (0.025)
Treatment group (no) -0.112** (0.014) -0.102** (0.007)
Difference in Difference -0.168** (0.055) -0.129** (0.027)
These estimates are based on count data regression models with the same controls as in Table 1.
Coefficients with * are significant at the 10% level. Coefficients with ** are significant at the 5% level.
† Combines the three exempt sub-populations (privately insured, young, poor) into a single control group.
Maximum number of observations: 37319.
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Table 3. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for the Reform Effect, Sample B
Change pre-post Poisson model Panel Negbin
effect standard effect standard
error error
Private insurance
Control group (yes) 0.008 (0.094) -0.008 (0.045)
Treatment group (no) -0.084** (0.016) -0.073** (0.008)
Difference in Difference -0.092 (0.095) -0.065 (0.046)
Youth
Control group (age 16-18) 0.122 (0.138) 0.099 (0.089)
Treatment group (age 19-) -0.085** (0.016) -0.071** (0.008)
Difference in Difference -0.208 (0.139) -0.170* (0.089)
Poor
Control group (yes) -0.040 (0.136) -0.119 (0.079)
Treatment group (no) -0.101** (0.019) -0.081** (0.010)
Difference in Difference -0.061 (0.138) 0.037 (0.080)
Combined†
Control group (yes) 0.016 (0.073) -0.009 (0.041)
Treatment group (no) -0.101** (0.019) -0.083** (0.010)
Difference in Difference -0.118 (0.076) -0.073* (0.042)
Coefficients with * are significant at the 10% level. Coefficients with ** are significant at the 5% level.
† Combines the three exempt sub-populations into a single control group.
Maximum number of observations: 18683.
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APPENDIX
Variable Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations (Sample A)
Doctor consultations is the self-reported number of visits to a doctor during the three months
prior to the interview; (2.80; 4.53)
Male is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is male; (0.487)
Education is educational levels, measured in years of schooling; (11.19; 2.48)
Married is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is married; (0.635)
Householdsize is the number of persons living in the household; (2.96; 1.37)
Active sport is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual participates in
sports at least once a week; (0.264)
Good health is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual classifies its own
health as either “very good” or “good”; (0.525)
Bad health is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual classifies its own
health as either “very bad” or “bad” (“fair” is the omitted reference category); (0.165)
Fulltime employed is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is in
fulltime employment at the time of the interview; (0.448)
Parttime employed is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is in
parttime employment at the time of the interview; (0.086)
Unemployed is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the individual is in unemployed
at the time of the interview; (0.065)
Non-participation is the omitted employment status category
Log(income) is the logarithmic household equivalent income, where the OECD scale has
been applied (weight of one for the first person, 0.7 for the second person, and 0.5 for each
additional person). Income is expressed in 1995 values using the CPI deflator published in
[10]; (7.53; 0.45).
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Figure 1: Prescription Drugs and the Demand for Doctor Visits
Source: Lauterbach et al. (2000)
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